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ABSTRACT 
It is undeniable that most of our modern universities are portraying themselves as 
factory-like institutions which manufacture useful knowledge. The term “useful 
knowledge” refers to a type of knowledge which directly has immediate payoff 
and practically commodifiable. Most modern universities are no longer 
spotlighted as the generator of new knowledge, the influential bodies in civic life 
and nation-state, the greatest critics of public policies, but reduced to and figuring 
as a major agent of economic growth. Posting economic growth as the model for 
universities is a form of corporatism in higher education level. Art disciplines, as 
a part of humanities, are inevitably framed by such a model. In which, art is 
understood as a mere aesthetic commodity and the artist is seen as a mechanical 
subject to be manipulated by profit motifs. This view has been well prevailing, 
but it is not incontestable. This paper is written as an attempt to critically respond 
towards such prevailing corporatist view. To do that, the author borrows some 
philosophical perspectives from an American philosopher, Martha C. Nussbaum 
(1947–now). Her philosophical accounts on art, imagination, and compassion as a 
form of distinctive moral emotion are considerably an adversary to the current 
perspective of art education which has been colonized by corporatism. From her 
perspective, more than just a mere commodity, art has a significant role in 
upholding democracy. Art has the power to nurture compassion, in which respect 
and concern for others are inherent. Respect and concern are the vital-ethical 
ingredients for democracy. One particular art form which, according to 
Nussbaum, can nurture compassion, intensively, is a tragedy. Through which, we 
shall see other people as human beings, not as objects of manipulation. Such 
philosophical views of hers may re-attune our current perspective on art 
education. 
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ABSTRAK 
Sulit dipungkiri bahwa kebanyakan dari universitas modern/masa kini kerap 
menampilkan wajahnya sebagai institusi yang serupa dengan pabrik manufaktur 
pengetahuan yang berguna. Istilah “pengetahuan yang berguna” merujuk 
kepada pengetahuan yang berdampak langsung dan secara praktis dapat 
dikomodifikasi. Kebanyakan dari universitas masa kini tidak lagi disorot sebagai 
sebuah generator bagi kebaruan pengetahuan, lembaga yang berpengaruh bagi 
kehidupan civic dan negara bangsa, kritikus terbesar bagi kebijakan-kebijakan 
publik, akan tetapi terreduksi sebagai agen utama dari pertumbuhan ekonomi. 
Penempatan pertumbuhan ekonomi sebagai model yang diacu oleh universitas 
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sesungguhnya adalah sebuah wujud korporatisme pada aras perguruan tinggi. 
Disiplin keilimuan seni, sebagai sebuah bagian dari humaniora, turut terbingkai 
oleh model tersebut. Dari perspektif korporatisme, seni dipahami sekadar 
komoditas estetis dan sang seniman dipandang sebagai subjek mekanistik yang 
dapat dimanipulasi oleh motif-motif profit. Pandangan ini masih bertahan dan 
populer sampai saat ini, akan tetapi tidak berarti tidak dapat dikontestasikan. 
Makalah ini ditulis sebagai sebuah upaya untuk menanggapi secara kritis 
pandangan korporatistik tersebut. Dalam rangka mencapai tujuan tersebut, 
penulis merujuk kepada beberapa pandangan filosofis dari salah satu filosof asal 
Amerika, yakni Martha Nussbaum (1947-sekarang). Pandangan filosofisnya 
tentang seni, imajinasi, dan bela rasa sebagai sebuah bentuk emosi moral 
distingtif adalah lawan dari perspektif tentang pendidikan seni yang telah 
dikolonisasi oleh korporatisme. Seni, melalui perspektifnya, memiliki peran yang 
signifikan dalam menegakkan demokrasi; keberadaannya lebih dari sekadar 
komoditas. Baginya seni berdaya untuk memelihara bela rasa, yang di dalamnya 
rasa hormat dan kepedulian terhadap yang lain inheren. Rasa hormat dan 
kepedulian, dalam hal ini, adalah unsur etis yang vital bagi demokrasi. Salah 
satu bentuk partikular dari seni yang menurut Nussbaum mampu secara intensif 
memelihara bela rasa, adalah tragedi. Melalui tragedi, kita akan memandang 
orang lain sebagai manusia, bukan sebagai objek untuk dimanipulasi. 
Pandangan-pandangan filosofis darinya merupakan ajakan bagi kita untuk 
menala kembali perspektif yang bertahan hingga kini tentang pendidikan seni. 
 
Kata Kunci: seni, imajinasi, bela rasa, korporatisme, demokrasi 
  
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
What is this paper about to share is basically a philosophical reflection regarding 
the current situation in most higher education institutions and the role of art within 
such context. The term ‘philosophical reflection’ generally refers to an attempt to 
borrow and contextualize Martha Nussbaum’s philosophical accounts regarding 
art within the higher education’s current situation. Martha Nussbaum (1947 - ) 
herself is an American philosopher who is well-versed in Roman and ancient 
Greek philosophy (www.famousphilosophers.org). Issues such as feminism, 
politics, ethics, emotion, and also art are mainly wrestled and colouring her 
philosophical concerns. Specifically, this paper shall try to focus on her 
philosophical accounts on art (especially tragedy as a form of art), imagination, 
compassion, and how are these considerably crucial for education in its 
contribution to preserve democracy. 
A question one might ask is: why Nussbaum?  In order to answer such 
question, there are at least three considerations shall be put forward. One may find 
these three considerations in the Forward of Nussbaum’s book entitled Not for 
Profit: Why Democracy Needs the Humanities, written by Ruth O’Brien. The first 
consideration relates to Nussbaum’s deep and broad knowledge of philosophy and 
educational theory which cover the Western’s and Non-Western’s (Nussbaum, 
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2010, p. x). This implies that her views are responsibly authoritative. Secondly, it 
relates to her critical perspective towards a considerably current view on 
education, in which education is conceived primarily a mere tool for economic 
growth. According to her, “economic growth does not invariably generate better 
quality of life,” on the contrary, it may lead “the quality of all our lives, and the 
health of our democracies, at risk” (Nussbaum, 2010, p. xi). This second 
consideration touches upon the crux of the problem which also is mainly 
concerned by this paper. The third one is related to her philosophical accounts on 
art and how it is closely linked with democracy. Through art, we “learn to imagine 
the situations of others, a capacity that is essential for a successful democracy” 
(Nussbaum, 2010, p. ix). This implies the importance of imagination in 
developing compassion which is highly crucial for democracy and art helps us in 
actualizing it. Such view may help us to re-attune our current perspectives on art: 
a mere aesthetic object or simply no other than an economic commodity.  
In order to deliver what have been put forward, systematically, this paper 
will start by laying out an existing problematic issue regarding contemporary 
higher education which is considered to be crucial, namely corporatism. 
Corporatism within the context of higher education shall be briefly elaborated as a 
background or an opening for further discussion. There are two considerations 
which support such decision. First, it tries to describe the current situation in the 
nowadays higher education institutions. Secondly, it also reflects Nussbaum’s 
critical concern regarding the prevailing perspective on education as a mere tool 
for economic growth. As the first part of the paper, it shall briefly put forward at 
least three things. First, it shall put forward the definition of corporatism. This 
shall be continued by pointing out the penetration of such -ism into the body of 
current higher education institutions. The last part shall highlight the problematic 
ethical-philosophical consequences of corporatism within the higher education 
institutions, which are the impoverished humanity and comatose democracy. 
The discussion shall be continued by elaborating in a concise manner, 
Nussbaum’s view on art and its significant role in preserving democracy. Within 
which, we shall touches upon Nussbaum’s accounts of imagination, compassion, 
and the relation between the two. Through art, imagination shall be triggered and, 
according to Nussbaum, may potentially lead to compassion, which is necessary 
for democracy. One form of art which she considers has the powerful capacity in 
triggering imagination that leads to compassion is tragedy. From her perspective, 
tragedy is positioned as a paradigmatic form of art which shall make 
‘compassionate imagination’ possible; and it is highly crucial for democracy. It 
should also be noted that her philosophical account regarding compassion is 
inseparable from her view on imagination as one of the basic capabilities (or 
opportunities), which is presupposed inherent within every human being. In short, 
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her philosophical conception of compassion is necessarily interrelated with her 
account of imagination. 
 
CORPORATISM IN HIGHER EDUCATION–A 
BACKGROUND 
What was once a business enterprise, a factory, an industry, or a merchant, are 
now racing to assemble university. The impetus to blur the boundaries between 
the interests of large corporation and industry with that of higher education 
institution has been well nurtured up until now. The invasion of business 
corporations into the university are welcomed even though they eventually alter 
the existence of the institution through the benefits they offer. Instead of 
suspending our judgment about it, most of us tend to confirm its existence for 
granted. Nowadays, it is quite often that most of us even view corporatized 
universities as highly credible and bona fide. This is no longer an assumption or 
an aspiration, but an explicit recognition which requires to be critically responded. 
What has been going on is a vulgar display of corporatism in higher 
education. Corporatism itself may be defined as an ideological perspective which 
prioritizes the interest and power of business corporations over society (Suarez-
Villa, 2009, p. 1). Its unimpeded penetration into the body of higher education 
institution is reinforced and buttressed by another worldwide accepted ideology, 
namely Neoliberalism (Waite, 2010, p. 82). Neoliberalism itself is a “theory of 
political economic practices that proposes that human well-being can best be 
advanced by liberating individual entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an 
institutional framework characterized by strong private property rights, free 
markets, and free trade. It aims to sustain the sense of competition regarding 
market forces, strengthen market friendly institutions, and advance individual 
freedom (Jessop, 2012, p. 1513). What about the role of the state in regards to 
such aim? The role of the state is to create and preserve an institutional framework 
appropriate to such practices” (Harvey, 2005, p. 2). Education, under the heading 
of Neoliberalism, is framed as a resource for global competition and wealth 
accumulation and the role of the state is confined in promoting such view (Waite, 
2010, p. 84). Under such heading, educational institutions are directed to learning 
processes which will serve such interests (Sleeter, 2008, p. 145). 
How does corporatism practically affect our current and prevailing views 
regarding the existence of contemporary higher education and its notably primary 
aspects such as knowledge, the position of university, and the students 
themselves? First, knowledge is understood as a mere commodity. This shall be 
exemplified by the wedding of Microsoft and Cambridge University, as reported 
by The Economist. In the October 1997, The Economist issued its special report 
entitled “Inside the Knowledge Factory”. Generally, the report put forward the 
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ongoing global crisis within the realm of higher education institutions worldwide 
(https://www.economist.com/special-report/1997/10/02/inside-the-knowledge-
factory). Such crisis referred to the dedication shifting universities. It was stated 
that universities were no longer dedicating themselves to pursue knowledge for 
the sake of knowledge itself. The dedication has been perverted to the pursuit of 
economic growth and profit through the act of fabricating useful knowledge, 
supported by the penetration of large business corporation into the body of 
university. The term ‘useful knowledge’ refers to knowledge which gives an 
immediate pay off in a utilitarian sense, such as electrical engineering, computer 
technology, biotechnology, and the like. They are considered as highly important 
and crucial for a nation to compete globally and accumulate wealth. How much 
profit which we can get out of their research and invented-utilizable products, 
determines the future health of a nation (Nussbaum, 2010, p. 7). 
The alliance of Microsoft and Cambridge University was referred by the 
report as a concrete example. It was stated that how Cambridge was brimming 
with pride when Microsoft decided to fund the university and choose its site to 
establish a computer science laboratory (now is known as Cambridge Computer 
Science and Technology Department). The department’s coverage encompasses 
some considerably useful knowledge, such as computer science, technology, and 
mathematics as the prominent fields of study. One of the intentions behind the 
funding, which might be the most salient, is inseparable from Microsoft business’ 
interest to compete with its rivalry, the Silicon Valley in the United States 
(https://www.independent.co.uk/news/bill-gates-chips-in-to-help-cambridge-
1241153.html). Microsoft needs a knowledge factory of its own to produce the 
most updated yet patentable innovations in computer technology to compete with 
its rival globally. Knowledge, innovation, including creativity, in this case, is 
reduced to a mere commodity which benefits financially. 
Secondly, nowadays, the current university is conceived as none the other: 
a sorting machine. In the year of 2002, Cambridge Ring, was founded. It is an 
association which its existence is infrastructural to the Computer Science and 
Technology department. Such association provides updated information, contacts, 
and business programs exclusively for the department’s graduates. The Ring 
channels Computer Science and Technology’s graduates with the computer 
technology industries (https://www.cst.cam.ac.uk./ring). The association 
implicitly positions itself as a sorting machine and explicitly also a service 
provider. From the perspective of the association and also the university itself, 
students, especially the graduates, are treated like none other than customer. The 
student-as-customer model is also applied pervasively in most modern or current 
universities and probably be the most welcomed model within our contemporary 
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society. We are here touching upon the third prevailing views regarding 
corporatism in higher education. 
In 1994, the student-as-customer model has been embraced and adopted by 
a group of UK-based universities. The model itself is no less than a way of 
business enterprise, an industry, or even a salesman in doing their economic-
transactional activity. When implemented in an institution of higher education, 
such model manipulates the students to act accordingly with the logic of 
marketing (Furedi, 2011, p. 3). The logic which is inherent in marketing activity 
penetrates so deep thus the distinction between an academic relationship and an 
economic-transactional one is blurred. Through such model, the university is 
reduced to a service provider, a pander with academic clothing, which provides 
what the student-customers want (as if they even really know what they want) 
rather than educating them to become educated. 
From what has been put forward, we can once again highlight how the 
dedication of higher education has truly shifted once it is infected by corporatism. 
As previously mentioned, the pursuit of economic growth and profit has been a 
dominant disposition of most (corporatized) contemporary universities. Such 
condition is not only made possible and prevailing by the penetration of large 
business corporation’s interests into the body of universities, but also actively 
buttressed by the significant role of the state. The support from the state flows due 
to the lucrative outcomes which are gained from the business corporations’ 
infiltration into the universities. It manufactures the three ingredients which are 
concerning the nation’s chief source for sustainable growth and prosperity; they 
are highly trained specialists, expert knowledge, and scientific & technological 
advances (Bok, 2003, p. 1). 
The support from the state usually presents in a form of regulatory 
policies. In Indonesia, such policies may be exemplified by the link and match 
policy, issued by the Indonesian Ministry of National Education in 1995. The link 
and match policy was proposed as a response to the rising of unemployed 
university’s graduates. It was initially conceptualized to overcome unemployment 
issue which was happened nationwide. The conceptualization of such policy was 
departing from one assumption: the rise of unemployment was caused by the 
impairment of existing education system 
(https://www.republika.co.id/berita/shortlink/21227). The policy suggested that 
such issue might be overcome if universities readjusted their curriculum to 
accommodate the interests of business corporations and industries. Once the 
curriculum was able to accommodate the needs of business corporations and 
industries, the university’s graduates should be well employed. From which, 
competency based curriculum was constituted. 
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Such policy implies the position of business corporations and industries as 
an academic consultant and this legitimates the significant role of the state and 
higher education in supporting the establishment of corporatism up until today. It 
suggests that the task of higher education is delivering competent graduates to 
serve the interests of business corporations and industries (DIKTI, 2003, p. 8). 
University has become a human factory which produces “generations of useful 
machines” (Nussbaum, 2010, p. 2) and this will lead us to a greater crisis in 
humanity yet a comatose democracy. Instead of cultivating imagination, this 
according to Nussbaum is what makes us human, corporatized higher education 
polishes the manipulative dexterity.  
Corporatized higher education, through its creativity commodification, replaces 
respect and concern for others (which according to Nussbaum, they grow out of 
the ability to imagine), with manipulation. By replacing respect and concern with 
manipulation, corporatism actively participates in putting democracy in a coma. 
Since democracy is likely depending upon education for its sustenance (Waite, 
2010, p. 99), corporatized higher education has a significant role in comatose 
democracy. In turn, it will replace democracy with corporatocracy. The term 
corporatocracy refers to “a political system in which powerful corporate interest 
groups dominate the policy agenda” (Sachs, 2011, p. 104). It is no longer ‘by the 
people and for the people’, but it is shifting to ‘by the corporation and for the 
corporation’ and our current higher education system is definitely has a prominent 
role in giving birth to it. Up to this stage, we may ask: how does Nussbaum’s view 
on art might be a relevant contesting perspective to such corporatized one? The 
answer to this question shall be briefly elaborated in the next part. 
 
ART, IMAGINATION, AND COMPASSION FROM 
NUSSBAUM’S PERSPECTIVE 
Within the context of corporatized higher education, one direct step, which is 
usually taken to sustain the sovereignty of corporatism, is to make less room for 
arts and humanities courses, in favor for more ‘useful’ subjects (Nussbaum, 2010, 
p. 23). From the perspective of corporatism, such direct step is necessary and 
considerably proper. Why? Art, according to Nussbaum, is the great enemy of 
obtuseness and obtuseness is necessary to carry out programs of economic growth 
which ignore respect and concern for others as the base for democracy 
(Nussbaum, 2010, p. 23). The artist, as the aesthetic subject, is no reliable servant 
of any ideology (Nussbaum, 2010, pp. 23-24), especially of the one which 
oppresses and stunts imagination. By giving no room for art within the realm of 
higher education, it simultaneously eliminates the vital component for democracy, 
which is compassion. Art, as part of the humanities, provides “a capacity for 
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genuine concern for others” through igniting “the ability to imagine what the 
experience of another might be like” (Nussbaum, 2010, p. 97). It teaches people to 
be capable of “living with others without control,” manipulation, and 
objectification (Nussbaum, 2010, p. 101). Such values are definitely not the 
concerns of Corporatism because they simply useless for financial profit and 
economic growth. 
From Nussbaum’s perspective, art has the capacity to ignite one’s 
imagination in acknowledging his existence as part of global citizenship and in 
turn, such imagination will give rise to compassion which is crucial for preserving 
democracy. Imagination, in Nussbaum’s philosophical account, is understood as 
one of the capabilities central to human being which enables us to put the well-
being of others as an end. Capability itself is one of the prominent philosophical 
views from Nussbaum. Her philosophical ideas of capability are developed and 
inspired by another philosopher, namely Amartya Sen (1933 - ). Sen himself 
views capability as “substantial freedoms” or “a set of (usually interrelated) 
opportunities to choose and to act” (Nussbaum, 2011, p. 20). It is “what is this 
person able to do and to be” (Nussbaum, 2011, p. 20). Departing from her 
conception of capability, imagination is an inherent opportunity in someone which 
will enable her or him to act and to decide who she or he is. 
Imagination, from Nussbaum’s perspective, is not just a matter of 
cognition or understood within the realm of epistemology, but it has an ethical 
dimension. As mentioned previously, it has to do with a possibility to choose an 
action and deciding who one is; as such unquestionably is presupposed by a 
certain conception of the good. Such view on imagination is also influenced by 
her reading of one great Greek philosopher, Aristotle (384 – 322 BC). One 
philosophical concept from Aristotle which influences Nussbaum in developing 
her account on imagination is phantasy or phantasia. Phantasia refers to “the 
active and selective aspect of perception” and “it works closely in tandem with 
memory, enabling the creature to focus on absent experienced items in their 
concreteness, and even to form new combinations, not yet experienced, from 
items that have entered sense experience” (Nussbaum, 1990, p. 77). The linkage 
of imagination with ethical concern is represented by the deliberative 
characteristic of perception itself, which is its selective aspect. One’s perception 
of things does not spring forth in indiscriminate manner but it is “something that 
answers to one of his or her practical interests or concerns” (Nussbaum, 1990, p. 
77). It corresponds with one’s view of what should be pursued and what should be 
avoided; it is inevitably related to one’s conception of the good.  
Through art, imagination is oriented to the good of others. The well-being 
of others shall be selected as something that is worth pursuing. Through which, 
the imagination that is cultivated by art is potentially growing a sense of 
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compassion towards others. Art, according to Nussbaum, is closely associated 
with “the ability to think critically; the ability to transcend local loyalties and to 
approach world problems as a “citizens of the world”; and, finally, the ability to 
imagine sympathetically the predicament of another person” (Nussbaum, 2010, p. 
7). The ability to “to imagine sympathetically the predicament of another person” 
specifically shows the linkage between imagination and compassion; and this is 
made possible by acknowledging one’s existence as the citizens of the world (not 
just as an apparatus of the corporate or a bolt of an industrial machine). 
The interrelation between imagination and compassion is signified by 
Nussbaum in a more straightforward manner through her definition of 
compassion. Compassion, according to Nussbaum, is a form of emotion, namely 
“an emotion that has been relied on to hook our imaginations to the good of others 
and to make them the object of our intense care” (Nussbaum, 2001, p. 13). The 
well-being, the good of others (not economic wealth and profit), is placed as an 
end for our ethical conduct and this requires active role of imagination which is 
cultivated by the arts; this is why art is important for democracy. Besides it is 
closely linked with imagination, Nussbaum’s view on compassion is also 
inseparable from her philosophical account of emotion which is also quite central 
in her philosophy. In fact, her definition of compassion tries to show how emotion 
is a point where imagination and concerns for the others’ meet. 
Nussbaum’s view on emotion is different from what is commonly 
accepted up until today, which is conceived within the feeling and thinking 
dichotomy (Das, 2017, p. 2). According to her, emotion is not a mere “unthinking 
forces that have no connection with our thoughts, evaluations, or plans” 
(Nussbaum, 2001, pp. 26-27). She views emotion as cognitive-evaluative 
judgment and such view stands as a critical response towards a dominating 
conception of emotion which still prevails today. It is an adversary to a traditional 
or commonly Western accepted view on emotions as “objectless feelings of pain 
and/or pleasure” (Nussbaum, 2001, p. 35). Nussbaum dissents this Western 
traditional view on emotions. She argues that emotions are not objectless or 
simply a thoughtless forces. In order to show this, Nussbaum describes her 
argument in three ways. 
First, emotions are not objectless, “they are about something: they have an 
object” (Nussbaum, 2001, p. 27). Our fear or grief is fear or grief about 
something. When we experienced fear, our heart trembled or leaped. Fear is 
always a fear of something and if this something is taken away, then it might just 
be trembling or heart-leaping. Secondly, the object towards which our emotions 
are directed is “an intentional object” (Nussbaum, 2001, p. 27). The about-ness of 
the object is not external but internal. It is not something that being pointed and 
then let it go. As Nussbaum suggests, it is internal. The about-ness is understood 
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internally in a sense that it “comes from my active ways of seeing and 
interpreting: it is not like being given a snapshot of the object, but requires 
looking at the object, so to speak, through one’s own window (Nussbaum, 2001, 
p. 28).  In grief, we see something or a person as lost, while in love we perceive 
someone as full of radiance. There is a sense of captivating in the about-ness. The 
about-ness of something is ‘haunting’ or enthralling us in such ways thus our gaze 
is ‘locked’ and directed towards the object. Thirdly, these emotions “embody not 
simply ways of seeing an object, but beliefs – often very complex – about the 
object” (Nussbaum, 2001, p. 28). Our emotions involve certain beliefs about the 
object and these beliefs are not trivial but invested with highly significant value. 
For example, in order to be angry, we must believe that something obnoxious has 
significantly happened to us or someone that happens to be dearly for us. 
Subsequently, we also believe that this obnoxious situation may have been done 
by someone willingly or accidentally. 
Emotions are, as has been described briefly, not construed and conceived 
as objectless or unthinking movements. They are not some irrational distractions, 
but are intelligent responses to the perception of value. As Nussbaum clearly 
explicates, “they are concerned with value, they see their object as invested with 
value or importance” (Nussbaum, 2001, p. 30). They proceed from judgments we 
make concerning the others (objects and people) that are beyond our control but 
valuable to us. Emotions are “forms of evaluative judgment that ascribe to certain 
things and person outside a person’s own control great importance for the 
person’s own flourishing. Emotions are thus, in effect, acknowledgements of 
neediness and lack of self-sufficiency” (Nussbaum, 2001, p. 22). The phrase 
“great importance for the person’s own flourishing” involves a wider sense of 
eudaimonia as a characteristic of emotions, not the narrow or utilitarian sense 
which leads it to a mere happiness. In a wider sense, it refers to “mutual relations 
of civic or personal love and friendship, in which the object is loved and benefited 
for his or her own sake” (Nussbaum, 2001, p. 32).  Such eudaimonistic character 
of emotions is also one of the reasons why Nussbaum strongly suggests that the 
theory of emotion must be included in the discussion of ethics.  
As a form of emotion, compassion is a distinctive moral one. Nussbaum’s 
philosophical account of emotion, again, is greatly influenced by Aristotle. From 
Aristotle’s perspective, compassion (eleos in Greek term), is not conceived as part 
of evaluative judgment (Deigh, 2004, p. 467). He construes compassion as a 
painful experience which is dealt by someone caused by the tragic predicament of 
others. This suffering or tragic predicament befalls to others not on her or his 
behalf (i.e. disaster-like or catastrophe-like). Someone suffers because of the 
undeserved suffering happens to others and such suffering might actually befall 
into him or her beyond his or her control. The term eleos itself is parallel to ‘pity’ 
	
	
Ferdinand	Indrajaya,	From	Imagination	to	Compassion	and	Democracy	
 
119 
in English. In our daily lives, according to Nussbaum, we often use pity, empathy, 
and sympathy, interchangeably with compassion (Nussbaum, 2001, p. 301). 
Nevertheless, the difference of those terms is also applied. For example, we can 
have self-pity, but not self-compassion.  
Though we interchangeably use the term pity and compassion quite often, 
Nussbaum normatively avoids this because of its (pity) pejorative character. Pity, 
according to her, is fully contained with “nuances of condescension and 
superiority to the sufferer” (Nussbaum, 2001, p. 301). Empathy, on the other 
hand, is also different from compassion. It is simply “an imaginative 
reconstruction of another person’s experience, whether that experience is happy or 
sad, pleasant or painful, or neutral, and whether the imaginer thinks the other 
person’s situation good, bad, or indifferent” (Nussbaum, 2001, p. 302), therefore 
it is way different from compassion and not even sufficient for it. Sympathy, from 
Nussbaum’s perspective, considerably has the closest meaning to compassion. Its 
similarity is found on the judgment that “the other person’s distress is bad” 
(Nussbaum, 2001, p. 302). The difference between sympathy and compassion lies 
in its intensity. According to Nussbaum, compassion is more “intense and 
suggests a greater degree of suffering, both on the part of the afflicted person and 
on the part of the person having the emotion” (Nussbaum, 2001, p. 302). 
According to Nussbaum, one particular art form which is quite powerful in 
nurturing compassion, in hooking our imagination to the well-being of others and 
placing them as the object of our concern intensively, is tragedy. Tragedy is a 
form of art, a type of drama which presents a subject matter or theme regarding a 
serious human suffering. It is rooted in our life as human being (Torghabeh, 2018, 
p. 234). The principle character who suffers usually experiences and deals with 
his or her tragic predicament which is not the consequences of his or her own past 
conduct, but due to a misfortune; and misfortune is one of the events in life. The 
quality of the misfortune is not trivial, but a catastrophic one. One of the tragedies 
which is used by Nussbaum as an example in her discussion of compassion, is the 
story of Sophocles’ Philoctetes, a Greek tragedy.  
The tragic life of Philoctetes was once retold by Nussbaum in “Boston 
Review”, a political and literary online forum. In that forum, she shared the story 
shortly: “Philoctetes was a good man and a good soldier. On his way to Troy to 
fight with the Greeks in the Trojan War, he had a terrible accident. He stepped by 
mistake into a sacred shrine, and his foot was bitten by the serpent who guarded 
the shrine. It began to ooze with a foul-smelling pus, and his cries of agony 
disrupted the religious observances of the troops. The commanders therefore 
abandoned him on a deserted island, with no resources but his bow and arrows. 
Ten years later, having learned that they cannot win the war without him, they 
return, determined to trick him into rejoining them. Sick, lonely, hungry, 
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exhausted from hunting his own food, Philoctetes still longs for friendship and 
activity. He greets his visitors with joy, delighted that he can interact with others 
after his long solitude. And he asks them to have compassion for him, seeing the 
troubles that life has brought him, troubles from which no human is safe” 
(Nussbaum, 1998). The story is about a tragic predicament which was experienced 
and dealt by Philoctetes, the principle character. In that story we can see that the 
character undergoes a “terrible suffering through no fault of his own” (Nussbaum, 
2001, p. 351) or it happens due to a misfortune. 
We can easily see that such works of art are not only promoting 
compassion in their audience “by inviting both empathy and the judgment of 
similar possibilities,” but also “assist our evolving judgments of size” (Nussbaum, 
2001, p. 351). This implies, first, that such works of art, like tragedy, encourage 
us to have compassion towards other’s terrible suffering since we ourselves might 
experience similar predicament. Secondly, what Nussbaum tries to put forward is 
that tragedy may assist our evolving judgment regarding “size”. The magnitude of 
Philoctetes’s suffering, although it is a fiction, is incomparable to, for example, 
someone who can’t go to his or her office because of the flood. The size of 
Philoctetes suffering may awake our awareness about him as fragile and 
vulnerable human being, as we are. We can no longer see him as a military object, 
an instrument, or within the context of Corporatism, a means to serve the interests 
of business and industry. The story strips down all the attributes which was 
previously adhered to the principle character and leaves him as simply human 
being. Not an object to be manipulated, but a human being who deserves respect. 
This kind of respect and concern is what constitutes and underlies democracy; this 
is why democracy needs tragedy. 
 
 
CLOSING REMARKS - A CONCLUSION 
This paper is not written as an attempt to against totally the involvement of 
business’ or corporation’s interest within the context of current higher education 
institution. Nor to reject the importance of scientific subjects as useful knowledge. 
It is an invitation to critically reflect upon the emerging ethical consequences from 
taking business’ or corporation’s interests as synonymous to the interests of 
education. When we embrace corporatism as the only proper ideology for us to 
fully grasp the existence of higher education, we put humanity prone to crisis. 
Reducing higher education as a mere tool for economic growth and profit equals 
to the impoverishment of humanity. It also paralyzes the capacity of art in igniting 
imagination and fostering compassion which are highly crucial for a healthy 
democratic living. At this point, Nussbaum’s views on art (tragedy in particular), 
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imagination, and compassion give us a considerably valuable insight to reflect on 
such matter.   
 Tragedy ignites, activates, and directs our imagination towards the good of 
other. Subsequently, it fosters compassion as well as our sense of humanity. It 
drives and captivates us to contemplate the fragility and finitude of our being as 
human. It is powerful to encourage “pleasure of the most difficult type: the 
pleasure of contemplating our mortality and our vulnerability to the worst 
disasters in life” (Nussbaum, 2001, p. 352). Furthermore, art in general does not 
only teach us to embrace our own vulnerable lives pleasantly, but as we see 
through tragedy, it also encourages us to embrace the lives of others. It teaches us 
about the same and different, the known and the new, and simultaneously who am 
I and what is beyond myself (Enslin, 2013, p. 66). Within which, is implied what 
has been inherent in the meaning of education itself that is vital for democracy: 
the civilization of human being as human being (Yoldaş, 2015, p. 545, Anttila, 
2018, p. 62). Art educates in a sense that it lies down the very necessary condition 
for not only democracy, but humanity. 
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